On The Subject Of Soviet Air Defenses In The Georgian SSR Circa 1989
I got to use sources with redacted authors from the CIA when writing this which is just cool even on a conceptual level. Feels like real Tom Clancy shit, even if it’s all declassified.
The scope of this report will focus primarily on providing an overview of the Soviet Air Defense Forces (PVO) and their employment of the USSR. To that end, some historical details will be used and explained upon in order to provide a larger context for the subject
To begin it should be noted that the PVO is a separate organizational entity from the Soviet Air Force (VVS). Soviet doctrine permitted an entirely separate branch dedicated to Air Defense, which from a western sensibility is a completely foreign concept. The general role of the PVO can best be described as defense of Soviet territory through the means of strategic air defense equipment and interceptor aircraft. As such, I was unable to find evidence suggesting the PVO was ever deployed outside the Soviet Union. That is not to say that they did not see service. On September 2nd 1958 a MIG-17 Fresco attached to the PVO shot down a C-130, tail number 60528. To quote the NSA :
“On the 2nd of September 1958, Soviet MiG-17 pilots shot down a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance-configured C-130 aircraft over Soviet Armenia; 17 crewman were aboard. The MiGs attacked the unarmed aircraft after it inadvertently penetrated denied airspace. It crashed near the village of Sasnashen, 34 miles northwest of Yerevan, the Armenian capital.”
The PVO would score one of it’s highest profile victories in 1960 when Gary Power’s U-2 was shot down on a reconnaissance mission sparking the 1960 U-2 Crisis. the U-2 was shot down by an SA-2 Guideline/ S-75 Dvina Missile, and the incident shattered US intelligence notions at the time that the U-2 was untouchable by Soviet Air Defenses. By the 1980’s the Soviet air defense arsenal had come to include the MIG-31 Foxbat, the SA-5 Gammon, and the SA-10 Grumble. Furthermore throughout the decade, the SA-19 Grison, the SA-11 Buk and the SA-15 Tor would come online creating an terrifying top down integrated air defense network. However, the PVO wouldn’t see many of the newer systems with the exception of the SA-10. To elaborate on this point, it must be discussed the difference between an strategic and a tactical air defense system.
The terms “Strategic air defense” and “Tactical air defense” are not clearly defined by any one organization. As is often the case, these are more so nebulous terms used to describe a general purpose of a given system. In my own experience I have come to define a strategic air defense system as one that focuses on a ranged defense of a strategically important site such as a city, or factory. Strategic air defense sites will often consist of static or semi static launchers and facilities, as they do not have a frequent requirement to change positions. They will also in many cases prioritize range and altitude of the target. the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5 fit extremely well into this description, and to an lesser extent, so does the SA-10. Conversely, a Tactical air defense system can be described as having a focus on frontline or near frontline defense. A tactical air defense system will be highly mobile and in often cases, self propelled. Tactical systems also tend to focus on low flying or maneuverable vehicles. I tend to associate an system like the SA-6 or the SA-19 as a tactical air defense system, although realistically an SA-18 is a prime example.
These definitions are important in that they can better explain why the PVO would seemingly limit itself to older systems. In fact to say they were limiting themselves would largely be a mischaracterization. The fact of the matter is that the PVO had a larger focus on strategic air defenses which simply didn’t require tactical air defenses. You can see this reflected in the American counters to these systems like the FB-111 and the B-1B. Both aircraft were designed to fly lower than the minimum altitude that a system like the SA-2 could achieve, and the switch to stealth didn’t occur until the SA-10 began to come online.
In the 1980’s the PVO began a process of modernization of which the ultimate goal was the replacement of all older systems with the SA-10 . However, these plans were expected to reach completion around 1995 and they were likely severely disrupted by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Even still, the process of modernization was not swift in the Georgian SSR. The priority for the Soviets was much more in the north and in eastern Europe. Regions like the Ukranian and Belarusian SSRs would have been much higher priorities, and that’s not even mentioning Warsaw Pact nations like East Germany and Poland. Therefor by the late 80’s the Georgian SSR would be left with a competent but dated surface to air network. While some of it’s Airwings would still be fitted out with aircraft like the MIG-31, many would still be relegated to the older frontline fighters like the MIG-23 or even the MIG-21 in some cases.
Overall the PVO in Georgia is misrepresented as a lackluster air defense network. In truth, it’s more so a case of the system being slightly dated. The Soviets spent so much time and resources working on tactical air defense systems, that the strategic air defense systems that the PVO likely would have bought simply were never developed. And then by the time the SA-10 came it to replace the aging network, the USSR collapsed, and the responsibility of rebuilding and updating the network was then left to the now cashed strapped and unstable nation of Georgia. A situation which was exacerbated by the invasion of the country by Russia 20 years later.
Sources :
"The Shootdown of Flight 60528." Archived 2014-06-01 at the Wayback Machine National Vigilance Park- NSA/CSS via nsa.gov, 15 January 2009. Retrieved: 03 JUL 2024.
“The Soviet SA-5 Deployment Program.” CIA FOIA Reading Room, CIA, www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000969866.pdf. Accessed 3 July 2024.
CIA, PVO, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80-00809A000600020158-1.pdf. Accessed 3 July 2024.
